D113 and D214 Risk of nuclear war. Fallout shelters. Instructions for the Piedralaves shelter

D113

UMMOAELEWE
Year: 1973

FRIENDS:

When this documentation reaches your hands, we shall certainly be ready to depart from the Earth. It is very likely that we shall return; it is possible, however, that we shall not, not only because of certain hypothetical events that may rush upon your Cold Star in the coming days, but also for reasons unconnected with the Social Network of the Earth.

Foreseeing both circumstances, we have adopted measures intended for you, as you have been able to see in the previous messages.

In any case, it will not be in vain to insist on the precautionary measures in the event that the international situation should reach a critical level on Earth. Such insistence might be interpreted as a symptom of a truly serious, fatally serious situation: that is not at all the case. Any of your experts in occupational safety would confirm that adopting some prophylactic measures, some prudently selected precautions, does not imply that the worker concerned must necessarily fall victim to unfortunate circumstances.

In making you the offer, at critical moments, considerations about the possible state of anguish it may cause must not move us. It is you who must, with all calm, come to the conclusion that dramatising the meaning of this proposal more than necessary, or suspecting that behind it lies a merciful attitude intended to reassure you, is illogical.

When we dictated the message you have received, we could not reveal to you the true nature of the approaching conflict. From the topical information offered to you by the agencies, you are aware of the international situation. We must not hide from you that the conflict is of much greater importance than some news media reflect for consumption by the general public.

In the past Indochinese conflict, the course of events followed a process in accordance with the will of the great powers. Its own course and the conditions that would bring about its end were known. At no time did the General Staffs set in motion the mechanisms of defence and deterrence to face the armed clash.

What makes the present confrontation serious is the lack of agreement regarding the development of the attack suffered by the State of Israel. The secret alert decreed by the General Staffs to their nuclear logistic forces is a clear symptom of the gravity of the situation. Moreover, we can assure you that before a nuclear confrontation is reached there is more than a 71% probability that the course of the process will evolve differently.

Nor can we know, with the information available to us, what the final outcome will be, but we can assure you that a decision by the United States to intervene directly in the conflict will be the sign that the probability of a nuclear war has reached 80%.

You can do nothing but witness, unarmed, this gigantic and monstrous game of interests. But at least, should the case arise, you will be able to count on our help to the extent that your brothers involved in the process decide immorally to break the promise they made to us very recently. We cannot do more for you in that case, believe it. Inviting you to occupy those bases from today, without first having the certainty that a catastrophic hour is approaching, could have very serious consequences, yes. Afterwards, as is most likely, it would all turn out to be an ineffective alarm. If at least we were on Earth, we would have the usual means of control that would allow us to direct the operation personally. A decision by our superiors obliges us to bring forward the date recently planned for our departure. We can confess to you that, even though we possess reliable data about what is going to happen, events have rushed ahead, exceeding the probabilistic estimates we had made at their beginning.

It seems that the Israeli intelligence services managed to gain access in the Soviet Union to the planned operations and, consequently, the Syrian and Egyptian general staffs, despite the evident risk of bringing the operations forward, will adopt the unilateral attitude of carrying out the attack «even against the opposition of their own Soviet advisers».

The date planned for the offensive was 17 November, with a breakthrough of the front across the Canal.

It was then expected to complete the massive aid to Jordan, which in turn would launch an attack by the Palestinian guerrillas, followed by parallel offensives by the regular Jordanian and Syrian forces on their respective borders.

The haste with regard to the plans, carrying them out before Jordan was in a position to intervene, together with the fact that that unfortunate country is in the hands of a criminal, gives the conflict a stamp of uncertainty that at this moment disorients not only the adversaries but also the great powers.

There is no other reason for the rise in the probabilistic level of the risk of a nuclear conflagration that we have indicated to you.

Once the invasion of the territories justly claimed by the Arabs had begun, at the fixed point in time, we had estimated that same level at approximately 23% (+4.8; -6).

D214 (continuation of document D113, according to a handwritten note by Darnaude)

UNCODED PARAGRAPHS:

The following paragraphs do not have the character of «Coded» by our superiors. They are complementary comments on the rules you have surely had occasion to read. Comments which, through repetition, will help you to memorise them better and to clear up certain doubts. The importance of those same rules would make this addition advisable.

Accept them as a definitive summary. We advise you to read them more than once.

(Do not make photocopies or reproductions by any recording procedure, although: provided you take measures so that, should they fall into other hands, they cannot be interpreted, your brothers may, on a separate sheet, extract special points in some graphic signs. (Let one or another of the following brothers of yours keep these pages: Jorge Barrenechea, Juan Domínguez, Juan Aguirre)

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COMMENTS: RULE ONE

For evident humanitarian reasons you should not let some of your brothers, whom you prevent from accessing this information, know of it until the necessary moment when the emergency signal may be received. A very severe duty morally obliges you to communicate with them before saving yourselves. We insist that, before communicating the content to his wife and children, each of your brothers must reflect on it (especially in the case of his children if they are minors) and in that of his wife if she suffers from some condition that might disturb her. But whatever decision you personally adopt, you must make sure that THERE HAS BEEN NO LEAK OF THE NEWS.

COMMENTS: RULE TWO

This rule undoubtedly presents the gloomiest and most insoluble aspects. We cannot in any way claim for ourselves the very hard decision of fixing the names of the persons who will be beneficiaries, the chances of success being strongly linked, in inverse ratio, to the number of brothers who will make up the expedition.

We suspect that this could create in you logical and understandable reactions strongly conditioned by a selfish attitude. It is for no other reason that my brothers have guided you by advocating an order of priority based on kinship.

Decisions contravening this rule (inclusion of a fiancée for some unmarried beneficiary, inclusion of other relatives) would be severely analysed by the deciding council that you would form, and by secret ballot to avoid violent situations. It could be equally painful to define the names of those eighteen families, with an average number of nine beneficiaries. If you agree to reduce that figure, this should not be interpreted as an increase in the level of beneficiaries (nine) per family, but as a means aimed at reducing the size of the expedition as far as possible.

We repeat that the figure of 196 in total (162 places for you) is a permitted limit which it would be advisable NOT TO REACH.

RULE THREE

It is prudent to make legible photocopies of the coded note we are giving you. Contact with other brothers of yours under such critical conditions may be subject to foreseeable situations, and multiplying the chances of deciphering this document at a given moment ensures the chances of the emergency plan being carried out without mishap.

We have organised this project so that the deciphering code will be operative only when our collaborators receive the message they are expecting in case of emergency. Keep together from now on so that each of you knows in any case how to communicate urgently with the others. It is prudent to fix a collective meeting point, free from any risk of surveillance.

RULE FOUR

If a stranger presents himself to you with the deciphering code, validated by our seal, receive him immediately, ceasing all other activity and, without useless reactions of panic, proceed at once to the deciphering, «slowly and unhurriedly». The operation may take about two hours; because of errors due to nervousness, ask another brother to repeat the deciphering process and compare your results. Immediately afterwards, communicate it to the others by means of a key that you yourselves must choose at once.

RULE FIVE

The journey to the town of Piedralaves (Province of ÁVILA) must be planned independently, as you prudently see fit.

You may organise it disguised as an excursion. Plan to get there, where the families will gather while it is advisable for the leaders of it [Translator's note by ummo-sciences: of the excursion] to carry out the location of the bag containing the equipment and the instructions. Bear in mind that it is a small town and that abnormal behaviour on the part of the expeditionaries might provoke very serious and irreversible consequences on the part of the inhabitants and the authorities.

RULE SIX

The operation of recovering the bag must be carried out by the leaders of the operation. Take care with the opening details we have communicated to you in the coded document; forcing the bag through a reaction of uncontrolled nervousness would mean the destruction of part of its contents.

As the instructions on how to make the journey to the remote point of the base are very clearly coded inside the bag, together with the time at which it must begin, according to the attached calendar, it would be advisable for you to decide beforehand on some excuse for outsiders in case of interference (cultural expedition, archaeological excavation, etc.).

EVERYONE MUST SWALLOW THE CALMING CAPSULES.

RULE SEVEN

Put into practice strict rules for inspecting the luggage carried, so that it meets the limitation specifications set out in the rule. Also avoid carrying superfluous objects.

If the means of transport we advise are available, the vehicles must be abandoned near PIEDRALAVES or at other points of the town, even at the risk of arousing later suspicion.

RULE EIGHT

About one kilometre before the base (this is perfectly explained in the instructions and in the use of the detectors that each group leader will carry in his ear), split up into spaced and independent groups.

At about a hundred metres, you will gather again, simulating a halt on a supposed excursion, until complete darkness. Arrange guards in the surroundings to prevent interference by intruders near the wood, while three or four members proceed to reread the instructions for opening the base.

As it is assumed that everyone will be wearing warm clothing, it is not prudent to light fires during the wait. It is not likely that the area will be snow-covered at those critical moments. In any case (barring an exceptional snowfall), even if that meteor appears, the location operation will not be difficult.

RULE NINE: NOT CODED. Merely indicative.

It is prudent to hide from the children until the end the true reason for the expedition.

VERY IMPORTANT: If, through the media, the grave news should reach you that nuclear operations had already begun, it would be the very serious symptom that our present plan has failed, either through the betrayal of some member of the network of your brothers or through some unforeseeable failure in the system.

Our advice is that you remain on the lookout for news arriving late (that is, the code), but from that moment give priority to the instructions (indications from your Civil Defence Authorities) without waiting an instant for the arrival of the messenger. Or else evacuate on your own initiative to places far from the North American bases in Spain, protected by features of the terrain.

In any case, you must not give way to panic. Other interpretations could be that the key men (your brothers in People's China and the United States) knew with certainty that the nuclear conflict is not going to affect the Iberian Peninsula in this case; perhaps other brothers of yours situated at another point of the globe receive the emergency signal without it affecting you. We repeat that, in any case, you should give priority to directives other than ours.

REFLECT ON ALL THESE INDICATIONS WITHOUT FEAR. Rest assured that within a few months all this will probably have been no more than a bad dream. The great powers, in turn, will know how to activate other means before allowing a nuclear holocaust that would constitute the definitive ruin of the reigning Capitalism and the definitive annihilation of their own populations.

It is enough, however, for a disturbing occasion to make such a conflict possible: the possibility that certain containers detect and annihilate in time the fusion-fission warheads before they reach their target, with neutralisation probabilities of 77 to 85%. In any case, the remaining percentage has sufficient deterrent capacity for the general staffs to reflect seriously before entering into that confrontation.

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«DS» INFORMATION

In the decoding procedure, the neutral letters separating the words must be removed according to rule 3 of the code.

The figures, as well as the expression of sexagesimal degrees and minutes of arc, are real in the context. They must not be deciphered.

Do not decipher the expressions in brackets.